THE SIGNIFICANT WARMING OF INDO-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
This article examines the dynamics of Indo-Israeli relations in the post-Cold War period. What is most surprising is the considerable extent to which Indo-Israeli relations have advanced since the normalization of relations in 1992, in stark contrast with the coolness from the Indian side during the entire Cold War period. Though Indo-Israeli ties still remain constrained by several factors, India and Israel have forged such close ties that some scholars refer to the two states as strategic partners. This article, however, will attempt to demonstrate that the Indo-Israeli relationship does not in fact form a "strategic partnership."
The
Republic of India and the State of Israel, both territories formerly
administered by Great Britain, were established less than a year apart
(India in August 1947 and Israel in May 1948). From the beginning,
relations between the two new states proved rather arduous. Since the
1920s, the leaders of the Indian liberation movement Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru had fervently opposed the partition of Palestine and
the creation of a Jewish state on this territory. On November 29, 1947,
India's representative to the UN General Assembly had voted against the
partition resolution. While the State of Israel proclaimed its
independence in May 1948, it was only two years later, in September
1950, that India officially recognized the Jewish State. Even then, the
two states did not establish full diplomatic relations. In 1952, India
reluctantly permitted the opening of an Israeli consulate in Bombay and
maintained a fairly hostile posture toward the Jewish state in the
following decades.
A confluence of ideological, strategic, and
political factors--both international and domestic--impeded the
relationship between India and Israel. While the Indian rejection of
the partition of Palestine and the anti-Western, anti-imperialist
worldview of Indian leaders certainly played a role in the country’s
stance toward Israel during the entire period of the Cold War, India's
strategic interests and political constraints--in particular those
related to India’s close links with the Arab and Muslim world and to
India’s Muslim domestic population-- contributed to India’s
anti-Israeli stance. Despite occasional cooperation between Indian and
Israeli authorities--especially the military and security establishments--it
took India nearly 40 years to change its stance toward the Jewish
state. On January 29, 1992, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao
officially normalized relations with Israel.
This
article examines the dynamics of Indo-Israeli relations since
normalization. First discussed are the three main areas of bilateral
cooperation--diplomatic and
political, military, and economic-- followed by the main constraints
hindering the advancement of these ties in each area of cooperation.
Last, the nature of the Indo-Israeli relationship is discussed, with particular focus on the question of whether the Indo-Israeli relationship forms a “strategic partnership.”
BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND ISRAEL
Diplomatic and Political Cooperation
Since
the end of the Cold War, there has been significant progress in
Indo-Israeli relations on the diplomatic and political level. In the
early 1990s, several major shifts in the international system as well
as changes on the regional and domestic levels decreased the impact of
the constraints that had hindered relations between India and Israel
throughout the Cold War and created favorable conditions for the
rapprochement and normalization of relations between the two states.
India’s fear of alienating Arab and Muslim states if it forged ties
with Israel diminished when it saw those states soften their attitudes
toward Israel with the opening of the peace process. The impact of the
Muslim factor on India’s domestic politics decreased on account of the
ascension to power in the 1990s of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a
Hindu nationalist party with very favorable views towards Israel.[1]
Even
more significant were new constraints that made it necessary for India
to rethink its foreign policy and favor rapprochement with Israel.
First and foremost, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union greatly affected India’s interests. India and the Soviet
Union had been close allies for several decades and above all, the
Soviet Union was meeting nearly 80 percent of India’s military needs in
1991.[2]
During the early 1990s, it thus became imperative for India to find
itself new partners and most importantly, new military suppliers.
Improving relations with Israel was therefore an interesting option,
especially in the field of defense.
Second
and no less important, the majority of India’s political establishment
understood in the immediate post-Cold War period that it was imperative
for India to build sound relations with the United States, the sole
hegemonic power in the changed international system. Indian leaders
came to assume that normalization with Israel would facilitate India’s
rapprochement with the United States, since they believed that the
American Jewish lobby had a major influence on the foreign policy
decisions of Washington. Indian Prime Minister Rao, in particular, was
convinced that normalization with Israel was necessary to improve
India’s standing vis-à-vis the American Jewish community and the U.S.
political establishment.[3]
Thus,
on January 29, 1992, Prime Minister Rao decided to normalize relations
with Israel and to establish full diplomatic ties with the Jewish state.
Of
the many bilateral visits of officials and agreements signed by India
and Israel since 1992 signal the significant improvement of diplomatic
and political ties between the two states. Then Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon’s 2003 visit to India constituted the first official visit of an
Israeli prime minister to India. During his three-day visit, Sharon
held talks on a wide range of issues with India’s Prime Minister
Vajpayee and other senior Indian officials. In addition, six bilateral
agreements were signed as a result of these discussions.[4] At the conclusion of the visit, the two prime ministers issued the Delhi Statement on Friendship and Cooperation.[5]
Another
significant change in relations between India and Israel on the
diplomatic and political level since 1992 was the positive shift in
India’s attitude with regard to Israel on the Palestine issue. Though
its representative in the UN General Assembly continues to vote in
favor of most resolutions condemning Israeli policy as in the past,
India has ceased to participate along with the Arab states in the
active promotion of texts hostile to Israel.[6]
Military Cooperation
Arms sales and defense cooperation formed a prime impetus for improved ties between India and Israel in the early 1990s. Indo-Israeli
military ties have considerably expanded since 1992, especially after
the BJP’s ascension to power in 1998, and even more so since around 2005. Today, military cooperation continues to form the core of the Indo-Israeli relationship.
Initially,
a buyer-supplier relationship was formed between the two countries.
India purchased from Israel advanced weapons systems and technologies.
In addition to large volume of military sales by Israel to India since
1992, in the early 2000s, under the favorable auspices of India’s
BJP-led government, the first joint Indo-Israeli military ventures were
formed for the development of specific weapons systems and
technologies. It marked a new phase in the military relationship,
signaling a greater trust and synergy between the defense
establishments of the two states.[7] Accrued
cooperation in intelligence and counterterrorism has also further
strengthened bilateral military ties, especially after then Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 2003 visit to India.
In
2004, there were concerns that the return to power of the Indian
National Congress party in India would strain the two states’ defense
and security ties. However, Indo-Israeli ties have continued to expand
at an even faster pace, and in early 2009, various media outlets
reported that Israel had become India’s prime supplier of weapons and
military technology.[8] The reception by India of the first Israeli Phalcon early warning plane in May 2009 was enthusiastic.[9]
Several
strategic interests account for the extensive development of
Indo-Israeli ties on the military front since normalization. After
having lost the Soviet Union as its primary strategic and military
partner, Israel rapidly emerged as an alternate military supplier for
India. For Israel’s part, the need for
considerable resources to finance the development of new weapons
systems and technologies and the country’s limited domestic market[10] required Israeli defense industries to generate revenues through military product exports. With its large domestic market and growing defense budget, India is an extremely attractive partner for Israel.
As both India and Israel are eager to improve capabilities to fight against similar challenges and threats, military cooperation between the two states allows the defense industries to share the expensive development costs of new weapons systems and technologies. Three
other major mutual strategic interests that have enhanced defense and
security ties include the fight against terrorism and radical Islam,
concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missile technology, and the growing interest of the two
states for the Indian Ocean.
Economic Cooperation
Though
it did not initially form the main impetus for improved ties and still
does not constitute the core of the Indo-Israeli relationship, economic
cooperation between the two countries has steadily increased between
since 1992. In 2008, the total volume of
bilateral trade was over $4 billion, and India has become Israel's
third largest trading partner in Asia.[11]
Economic ties have also greatly expanded in the fields of agriculture,
science, and technology. In the scientific and technological sectors,
cooperation has mainly involved joint research and development
projects, especially in the fields of telecommunications and software.
Since the 1990s, cooperation has also prospered in the space sector, an
area of strategic importance for both states. As for agriculture,
dozens of joint ventures have been formed by Indian and Israeli
companies and research institutes, mainly in irrigation, water
management, and crop production.
Though
trade has been diversified to a certain extent, the diamond industry is
still Israel’s main trade area with India. Yet there is greater
potential for cooperation in other trade sectors as well, including
agriculture, renewable energies, and industrial research and
development.
There
are several interests underlying the Indo-Israeli economic
relationship. The limited size of the Israeli domestic market is a
major constraint on Israel’s economic development. It is imperative for
Israeli companies...
*Arielle Kandel holds degrees in international law and Middle East studies from the University of Aix-Marseille III and Ben-Gurion University. Her Master’s thesis focuses on Indo-Israeli strategic relations.
MERIA Journal Staff
Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
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