India's Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) came out with its latest journal, this issue focused on the Iran War and different international perspectives. I tell everyone that if you want to understand me, you have to know that I am an American, and I am a Jew; a patriot and a Zionist. And those two elements play a very active role in my analyses and how I see the world. i hoped to post responses to the questions with the war concluded or at least with a foregone conclusion in sight. But wars, especially with such weighty geopolitical issues in the balance, are really just getting started down that revolutionary path after under four months. We all need to be playing chess, not checkers.
Because FPRC has not put the issue online yet, I am replicating my section, which is on pages 38-50 of the journal. My part is on pages 32-39. Here is the text:
[Note: These answers have been formulated and written during a period in which no one is really sure what will happen next, and events that happened between the writing and publishing of this issue could change some predictions or verify them.]
1. How do you look at Trump's action in Iran: Disruptor or Reformer?
US President Donald Trump certainly has disrupted the geopolitical and international landscape and has had no problem challenging previously unchallenged assumptions about global relations and expected actions. I do not believe the two terms are mutually exclusive, especially because in doing so, he is reforming those structures to better reflect 21st century realities. Moreover, Trump’s goal of reforming many long lived institutions of the global order requires first that they be disrupted or shown to be obsolete and inadequate fortoday’s world. It’s not surprising that so many find the principles of international relations, created in the 1940s, to be dysfunctional today; but Donald Trump challenged them when others feared doing so. Institutional change is notoriously resistant to reform. Thus, it routinely must be preceded with some sort of disruption or even destruction. The mistake many people make about Trump is to assume that he does not have a vision for what comes after his disruption of the post-World War II rules-based global order.
Over the past several years, a coalition of authoritarianism has emerged, led by China, Russian, and Iran; with second tier nations including Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela. They provide a united front in international matters, though they often take different levels of action during each, and have attempted to replace the global economic order with the US dollar as its reserve currency, with one based on the Chinese Yuan. Additionally, Iran has been a critical arms supplier for Russia’s war against Ukraine; Iran and Venezuela together have provided China with almost a fifth of its oil and at heavily discounted rates due to US sanctions; and North Korea has provided Putin with troops for his war. Many of Trump’s moves can be understood as group’s dependence on the US economy with his tariffs, which he held out as a pre-condition of their access to the US consumer market. His next step was the overnight arrest of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro, which put that nation and its proven 303 billion barrels of oil under American dominance and broke it off from that coalition. Current US actions with regard to Iran threaten to remove one of the three pillars of that coalition of authoritarianism. They additionally make Putin’s war in Ukraine far more difficult to sustain by making it nigh impossible for the Islamic Republic of Iran to build any serious quantity of drones for his war. They also cut China off from major oil sources, which if ever revived to any extent will resume without the deep discounts on which the Chinese economy has come to depend. Covert attempts by China to rearm Iran, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi May 6, 2026 to China, following his April trip to Russia, and subsequent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping demonstrate that the coalition remains degraded but united. Yet, they could be little more than virtue signaling. A short time after those trips, Trump met with Xi in China, where the latter talked about buying more US crude and just before two China-bound tankers were allowed through the US blockade of the Straits of Hormuz. We also should take note that Trump has been very careful in making sure his actions in Iran and Venezuela have been set as clearly against the regimes alone and in support of their two peoples. Large majorities in both nations have cheered these actions and suggest that, once the regimes are removed, the peoples will opt to be strong allies of the United States.
Thus, distinguishing between Trump as a disruptor or reformer is a false dichotomy. Whether it is foreign policy, the nature of the press as biased gatekeepers, immigration, or a host of other issues, President Trump’s brand is to disrupt orders that were assumed untouchable with no problem violating presumed sacred cows that work against his understanding of US interests. But like former President Barack Obama before him, his goal is a radical transformation of America—and Obama specified that as an essential part of his campaign and how he governed. For Trump, no less than for Obama, his actions are far from random and, his critics’ rants aside, are part of a greater overall plan, making his disruptive actions reformative and him a reformer.
2. It appears Trump has not learnt from the history. Do you agree?
In the era of Donald Trump, few people are neutral, and almost all commentators, both inside and outside of the United States, are staking out positions for themselves as either Trump boosters or Trump haters. Similarly, most of the posturing about Trump, the war, and whether the President is repeating mistakes of the past; is colored by a desire to be seen as pro or anti-Trump. Hopefully, those of us on the pages of this journal have risen above that sort of partisanship and engage in good analysis, even if we reach varying conclusions from the data. Because media must fill their 24-hour cycle continuously, there is a demand for immediate conclusions and ideological certainty. At this point, it remains to be seen if Trump’s supporters or his detractors are right (I’m betting on the former). What lessons did he fail to learn? That his actions could pull the US into the sort of “forever war” against which he campaigned? The limits of military power to bring about regime change? He risks escalation that will “destabilize” the region or lead to a world war? Appeasement and negotiation are always preferable to war?
Will Iran turn out to be another “endless war”? No, and here is why. The two endless wars against which Trump, former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and their allies point to as models for how not to do things are Afghanistan (2001-2021 and Iraq (2003-2011), which together accounted for over 7,000 US military fatalities. Another is the War in Vietnam to varying extents 1955-1975). In all of these wars, the United States began with an enormous military advantage and, initially, overwhelming military success; so, too, with the current war with the Islamic Republic. Where they all got off track was when American planners decided that they could use those military successes to engage in nation-building: creating countries that are committed to western and democratic ideals. We were wrong, in essence, assuming that we could impose our cultural constructs and values on the native populations of those countries. This is not to say that Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, are not “ready for democracy,” only that whatever form of governance those peoples choose will be carried out with the values and understanding of their unique historical and cultural contexts. From the very start, President Trump has articulated clearly than any new government must come from the people of Iran themselves; and it is one of the few things on which he has never wavered. In fact, once the Israelis took out multiple layers of Iranian leadership, often with assets inside Iran, it was clear that Israel and the United States had the power to take out the Islamist regime and install another, but they did not do so or even considered doing so. The Iranian mullahs have dissembled, postured, made a rational agreement virtually impossible, and maintained a constant regime of terror to prevent an already existing popular uprising from having success. If regime change is an agenda item (one articulated by the Israelis but only rarely mentioned by the Americans), and the mullahs can continue dragging out the conflict, will Trump take the bait and authorize a full-blown invasion. I am betting he does not because he has learned that much from history.
Is it 1938 again in Europe? People who hate World War II references are not going to like this one either—unless they really want to learn from history. In 1936, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland, a German area west of the Rhine River that was separated from Germany after World War I, occupied until 1940, and demilitarized. On March 7, 1936, German troops crossed into the Rhineland and annexed it to the Third Reich. The European powers did nothing. Years later, a secret German protocol came to light which directed German commanders to turn back if either France or Great Britain opposed them. Many believe the allies’ inaction was a major turning point in the direction of events in the 1930’s and 1940’s. At the very least, it told that one aggressive and expansionist tyrant that he could keep moving his agenda without resistance, which is exactly what he did. In March 1938, he marched into Austria (Anchloss) without protest. He then accused the Czechs of persecuting Germans living in Czech areas bordering Germany and demanded that Czechoslovakia cede them to the Third Reich. Less than after his takeover of Austria, Hitler promised western leaders that if they agreed to cede him the Sudetenland, it would be then end of his territorial demands in Europe. Fascist Italy, Great Britain, and France attended the 1938 Munich conference and, ever more fearful of war with Germany, caved in to Hitler’s demand. Within a few months and on about the first anniversary of the Anchloss with Austria, Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia. These events together had a profound impact on the German Nazis. They came to see the western powers as weak and unwilling to fight for their beliefs. In fact, Hitler was reportedly surprised when Britain and France declared war on Germany after he invaded Poland. He expected that they would retreat as they had in the past. Of equal significance, their actions told Soviet leader Josef Stalin that they would not come to his aid either if German attacked; and it was on the basis of that realization that he authorized the notorious Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which enabled Hitler to launch the Second World War in Europe without having to worry about a Soviet response or a two-front war.
Europe today is not unlike the way it was in 1938, willing to talk about high principles but unwilling to do anything to defend them. While the European Union and its constituent countries all have gone on record as agreeing that the Islamic Republic of Iran must never have a nuclear weapon, they have also been oppositional to US actions and at times have refused American use of its bases on their soil for the war in Iran. Despite the Europeans’ posturing, three of them (Germany, Italy, and France in order) remained among the top ten destinations for Iranian exports through 2025. The policy associated with British and French actions in Munich is appeasement. While there are times when confrontation is not the right policy, bad actors will take the decision as an indication of weakness and press their demands harder and with less respect. One of my favorite colloquial definitions of appeasement is that it is like feeding a crocodile in the hopes that it will eat you last. Not finishing the job in Iran will send the same message that British and French inaction at Munich sent to Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. Iran already is demanding full control over the Straits of Hormuz and the extortion of millions for each ship that transits the Straits. If the US lets the Islamic Republic of Iran off the mat to recover, we all can expect escalating demands, heavier-handed methods, a nuclear Iran before the year is out, and trouble in other hot spots (e.g., Ukraine, Taiwan, Syria, Lebanon).
The Islamic Republic of Iran is looking at modern US history and has concluded that if it can hold out, even just survive, until the US midterm elections, it will succeed. The mullahs can point to those forever wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) and how domestic political opposition impeded unfettered decision making on the battlefield, and hurt US operations that might have brought those wars to successful conclusions from an American point of view. The US midterm elections in November 2026 could bring Trump’s opponents to power in one or more legislative chamber, thus undermining his efforts; or Trump could fear that very outcome and try to bring the war to a premature end, boosting his domestic political capital. I would not count on either of those things happening.
3. What are the stakes for Israel in its war with Iran?
During the Israel-Iran War (and later US war on Iran), I appeared on news shows frequently. The hosts all wanted my take on what the endgame was and the ultimate goal of the hostilities. My answer then and my answer now is that it must be regime change. No matter how devastating US and Israeli military strikes are on the Islamist regime, stopping short of regime change will leave those elements in place for a regrown and renewed Islamic Republic with all the danger, aggression, and hate to which it is committed. Ending the war without regime change is like taking your physician-prescribed antibiotics, but stopping when symptoms disappear instead of taking the entire regimen. Any physician will tell you that doing so leaves germs in your body that eventually will reconstitute the illness.
The 2023-2025 hostilities completely changed the face of the Middle East and the way all parties calculate risk and reward. As of now, the so-called Axis of Resistance no longer exists. Remnants and uncoordinated individuals affiliated with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the other mid-east terror groups continue to go after Israelis (and Jews outside of Israel), desperately trying to keep this a religious war; but even they are finding that nigh impossible. For religion has been replaced by leftist politics as the anti-Israel unifying force. While that might weaken Israel’s support in Europe, it has helped boost Israel’s brand in Asia and the Americas, especially but not exclusively in areas that are seeing a popular rejection of leftist overreach. The long-term impact in the United States remains to be seen. The 2026 hostilities have finished some jobs and will complete the rest, so long as Israel and the United States are not lured into ending their actions prematurely.
Prior to the October 7, 2023 terror attacks, Israeli policy with regard to Gaza and Hamas was known as “mowing the grass.” That referred to a policy of managing the war with Hamas and Gaza. Air Marshall Amir Khosla, former Vice Chair of the Indian Air Force, does a great job of looking at the policy, noting, “The ‘mowing the grass’ doctrine operates on the principle of limited warfare in asymmetric settings. Its objective is to limit Hamas’s ability to launch rockets, construct tunnels, or escalate attacks, thereby protecting Israeli civilians without committing to full-scale conquest.” That is, Israeli military had the ability and the right under international law to conduct a major offensive to destroy Hamas after any one of the terror groups indiscriminate bombing of Israeli schools, hospitals, and civilians. But it did not and only conducted limited strikes to temporarily halt Hamas’s ability to threaten Israeli civilians for a time. They knew that Hamas eventually would gain that ability back overtime, and use it to target Israeli civilians, as that is baked into Hamas’s raison d’erte. After October 7th, Israeli leaders realized that the policy was no longer viable, given Hamas’s massive funding by Iran and to a lesser extent Qatar, and a coordinated plan coming out of the Iranian mullahs and IRCG to launch mass terror attacks into Israel from the south (Hamas), north (Hezbollah), and east (PA and related terror groups), followed with missile attacks from Iran. Conclusion: that genocidal alliance among the Islamist terror groups under the direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran was now recognized as an existential threat, and that the various Palestinian groups would not ultimately see the light of living side by side with Israelis. Mowing the grass was a controversial policy even before October 7, 2023, but the horrific and essentially hate-induced atrocities by Palestinians that day put a dagger into its heart. The war that followed and today’s war in Iran ultimately tests the effectiveness of that policy change. Are those who claim that no amount of military might or air power that a democratic nation is willing to use, can ever eradicate its genocidal opponents correct, or will the final results show that hatred and passion can be defeated by equal passion and a commitment to victory?
If the Islamist regime in Tehran somehow survives the war, long term not only after a cessation of hostilities, it will be a marker of the limits of Israeli military and economic might. For while Israel long has had the firepower to defeat the Islamists, unlike its enemies, Israel will forebear and not use that firepower. For instance, despite the yelling crowd, Israel has been restrained in how it uses its air power over Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. It gives advance warning to civilians to vacate targeted areas, it has refrained from targeting facilities like schools, mosques, and hospitals unless they are being used for military purposes, which under the Geneva Convention voids any protection it might otherwise have. In Gaza, it attacked Hamas and its infrastructure. It has focused on destroying Hezbollah’s war making ability, its planned October 7 style invasion of northern Israel, its strongholds and infrastructure. And except for one attack on an oil facility, it has refrained from attacking Iranian infrastructure. Israel was able to maintain forward bases in hostile countries including Iraq and Iran without troubling itself about what those nations might do to retaliate. In an unprecedented move, it gave the Iron Dome defensive system to the UAE with Tamir interceptors and Israel Defense Forces personnel; as one defense analyst noted, “transforming strategic normalization with Abu Dhabi into direct wartime military integration.” While Israel has had nuclear weapons for decades, it has never used or threatened to use them, even though it faced wars on multiple fronts and genocidal calls for its destruction. Israeli courts, including the Supreme Court, have ruled against the government and military in several cases, restraining their freedom of action. How the war ends, and whether or not the Iranian people overthrow their horrible, Islamist government will have immense implications for Israel, the Middle East, and ultimately the rest of the world.
One rarely if ever discussed development over the last decade that is having a profound impact on current and future dynamics in this area is how the 2020 Abraham Accords, the threat of Iranian Islamist hegemony, and other factors have effectively removed religion as the dominant element in the Israel-Arab clash. Even before last year’s hostilities, Israelis started becoming familiar sights in these countries, especially the United Arab Emirates. Synagogues were restored and reconstituted in Bahrain (House of Ten Commandments, Manana the capital, renovations completed 2021) and Morocco (Slat Alfassiyine, Fez, restoration completed 2021). And in 2023, the first synagogue built in the Arab world since well before the modern State of Israel’s existence, was completed in the United Arab Emirates (Moses Ben Maimon Synagogue, Abu Dhabi). The latter was built as a co-equal house of worship in the UAE’s Abrahamic Family House and includes a mosque and church, as well. In June 2025, when Islamic Iran shot missiles at Jewish Israel, Muslim-majority Gulf States gave Israel intelligence and allowed Israel to use their airspace to intercept them. Other Islamic countries in the region, including Jordan, shot down the Iranian projectiles themselves, as they traversed their airspace on the way to Israel. None of them, including Saudi Arabia, subscribed to the racist and obsolete philosophy of a single Muslim Ummah, which would rather demand that they never side with non-Muslims over fellow Muslims. In fact, most analysts (including this one) believe that October 7 terror attacks and the subsequent war they caused, were timed as they were because Iran and its terror proxies feared that the normalization process was poised to include Saudi Arabia and a large cache of Arab and Muslim majority countries, many of whom already have extensive, though thinly-veiled relations with Israel. Most people and national leaders will make policy based on their own interests. In every real way (e.g., economically, militarily, developmentally), that favors relations with Israel.With a solid wall of opposition rooted in religion now broken, those entities are free to follow their interests without being ostracized by the rest of their co-religionists, as Egypt was when it because the first Arab nation to make peace with Israel. An Israeli victory strengthens the factors leading to normalization and will accelerate the Abraham Accords process. An (unlikely) Israeli defeat or failure to dislodge the Islamist threat from Iran and its proxies could lead those same countries to rethink what is in their best interests.
What of Israel’s relations with the United States? There is no question that the Red-Green Alliance has reared its head in American, whereby pro-Palestinian activists have emphasized a faux intersectionality between their cause and all causes of “national liberation.” For the moment, they in conjunction with open and avowed Jew-haters, have moved the needle away from popular support for Israel. Ultimate victory that topples the mullahs, removes an almost half century threat, and simultaneously knocks off a major element of the coalition against the US would be an irresistible point of pride that could move the needle back toward Israel’s favor—another important stake in the war’s outcome. Anything less than a clear victory will make it difficult for Israel to make that case before the American people. After the Obama administration abandoned Israel (currying favor with Israel’s enemies, disregarding Israel, and notably abstaining from a 2016 anti-Israel UN resolution), the Jewish state began looking for alternatives to US aid. When the Biden Administration slow walking critical wartime aid to pander to anti-Israel domestic forces, it convinced Israel further that it had to wean itself off of aid. Even though most Israelis will agree that Donald Trump has been a great and constant friend, as members of a vibrant democracy, they know that at some point, the Democrats will regain power. With a significant portion of the Democratic Party now joining in that pandering, Israeli leaders know that they cannot assume the aid will be continued. Hence, they are in the midst of a ten-year plan to eliminate US aid that includes an ascendant domestic defense industry. Victory today will give Israel the breathing room it needs to implement its plan; anything less could shorten its timelines.
Israel has emerged from the conflict thus far, as by far the pre-eminent military power in the region and one of the most powerful nations on earth. It had no trouble defeating the Chinese-made air defenses in Iran and outmatched other Russian and Chinese efforts. Both US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth went out of their way to praise Israel as a military partner and referred to the Jewish State as the world’s second greatest military power, after the United States. And indeed, no other world powers have the technological dominance and actual fighting experience that Israel has. Compare Israel’s showing with that of Russia in Ukraine. If Israeli dominance (and seemingly impossible operations like the Hezbollah pagers or assassinations of enemies in highly secured areas) continue, its brand will continue to impress. Moreover, throughout the wars and without a blip, the Israeli economy has continued to grow and heat up, with the Israeli stock market breaking record high after record high. If that continues through the end of the war, Israel’s economic resources and strength will continue to draw others into its orbit, for instance, several Arab and Muslim majority countries that are trying to transition from their current economic base to something that will function for them going forward.
4. It's difficult to treat Israel and Iran differently on their nuclear ambitions and advanced missile programs. Do you agree?
I disagree entirely. The two are similar on the most superficial level only. Israel maintains a policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” which entails neither confirming nor denying that it possess nuclear weapons; though hardly anyone on the planet today that doubts the Jewish State possesses them. Most analysts from a range of countries, disciplines, and perspectives believe that it has had them since 1966 or 1967. Think about that a moment. It means that Israel was the first country to have operational nuclear weapons after the so-called Big Five (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China), trailing the last of them by only two to three years. This also means that Israel had nukes when three Arab armies (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan) massed troops on its borders in a declared genocidal war to “drive the Jews into the sea,” as they declared. And at that very moment, the entire international consensus was that Israel would be destroyed in the impending 1967 War. Yet, Israel never even considered using its nukes. Nor did Israel threaten to use its nuclear weapons after Egyptian and Syrian forces, in a surprise attack on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, overwhelmed Israeli defenses and threatened to move further into Israel proper, again, with the expressed aim of destroying the Jewish State. Since then, Israel has been attacked continually by terror proxies, all of which have charters that specify the destruction of Israel and a Judenrein Middle East as their raison d’etre. Their constant actions and statements reverberate with the same genocidal rhetoric, yet Israel has never considered using strategic or tactical nuclear weapons on them or their Iranian or other sponsors. Israel has for sixty years demonstrated that even in the face of potential annihilation, its nuclear weapon are defensive only. None of world’s other eight nuclear powers have faced the unremitting and multinational effort to eliminate them that Israel has and still does. Yet, Israel has never used or threatened to use its nuclear weapons.
Israel’s fourth Prime Minister Golda Meir once noted, “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.” It was a quote I would hear again and again as accepted wisdom. We always knew that Israel could not afford to lose a war because, unlike it, Israel’s adversaries were waging wars of obliteration. They just did not succeed. Even today, many of them do not accept the right of the Jewish State to exist.
While Israel has provided decades of hard evidence that its nuclear weapons are defensive, what has the Islamic Republic of Iran shown us? The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of only two United Nations (UN) members to threaten the total annihilation of another UN member, the other being North Korea and its repeated threats to eliminate South Korea. Moreover, the total annihilation of Israel is at the core of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and basic theocratic belief system. Soon after the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, denounced Israel as an illegitimate "Zionist regime" and severed all diplomatic relations. Since then, destroying Israel as a core tenet of the regime has been touted in official rhetoric, military actions, its education, and its annual Quds Day on the last Friday of Ramadan that now features a ticking clock counting down Israel’s destruction. The clock is based on a 2015 prediction by Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei setting the date for realizing that dream, 2040. Significantly, the regime has acted on that threat. In 2018, a senior Iranian official said that the Islamic Republic was operationalizing a plan to achieve it but refused to give any details. Yet, its plan of surrounding Israel with what it calls an “axis of resistance,” became clear and operationalized right away. Between 2013 and 2023, Iran spent $16 Billion to fund genocidal terror groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; all equally committed to wiping Israel off the map and conducting ongoing terror attacks against the Jewish State in coordination with Iran. Iran even has a powerful position in its power structure dedicated to Israel’s destruction. That is the Quds Force, responsible for the terror operations of. Even before the October 7, 2023, terror attack, those groups slaughtered thousands of Israelis, which in a tiny nation with a population less that scores of cities worldwide represents a painful proportion. It also extended its genocidal reach globally against and non-Israeli Jews, such as the 1994 terror attack on a Buenos Aires synagogue. Thus, even without nukes, Iran has taken ongoing action to destroy Israel, funding it even at the expense of its own people. And as US President Donald Trump noted recently, “A nuclear Iran would blow us up, destroy Israel in minutes.”
During the Cold War, a philosophy known as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) was credited for both the US and USSR never using their huge nuclear arsenal; that is, if one used it, the other would retaliate and both parties would be obliterated. That same line of thought keeps other actors, such as India and Pakistan, from using their nukes. According to Berlin-based geopolitical analyst Rafael Castro, that same way of thinking would not deter a nuclear armed Iran. According to Castro, even a rational view through the lens of its millenarian Shi’ite Islamic theology: destroying Israel and Zionism would be a noble act; the murderers and any Iranian casualties would be rewarded with paradise; destroying Israel would Shi’ite Islam’s power and prestige; and it also would hasten the return of the Mahdi and Islam’s global supremacy. Iran also has threatened Europe because it is in the range of its ballistic missiles. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that Iranian plans are to destroy only Israel. The Iranian regime has conducted terror operations against the United States (which its theocratic leaders term “the Great Satan”) and has been declared a threat by a series of US Presidents who otherwise agree on very little (e.g., Barack Obama and Donald Trump). It has carried out operations against multiple European countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain; as well as nations on every other continent except Antarctica. What would they have been like if the rogue Iranian state possessed nuclear weapons and the ability to commit these acts with so-called “dirty bombs” equipped with nuclear material?
So on the one hand, Israel and Iran both have provided decades of hard evidence that they have used and would use nuclear weapons entirely differently from one another. The idea that the two are even remotely the same is laughable.
5. India's silence on Iran war was woefully weak choice, especially for a country that commands attention on the global stage. How far do you agree?
Actually, India’s position during this war has continued its policy since last year of maintaining a number of delicate balances. While one might expect a leading nation globally to take a stance one way or another, India is unique among global leaders in having interests on both sides of the conflict—and it would be precipitous to sacrifice that unique position, pretending that it would provide it with a “place at the table,” post-war. Speaking for the government, Union Home Minister said, “Our foreign policy is very clear. We want to maintain good relations with everyone.” External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has held meetings with both Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi. The most telling statement on the war, not surprisingly, came from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Speaking alongside of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, “Situation in West Asia is a matter of grave concern for us. We will keep working with countries in West Asia to ensure safety of Indians there.” It signaled friend and foe alike, potential and actual allies, and his 1.5 billion constituents that whatever India does will be rooted firmly in what matters to the people of India. When Congress leader Rahul Gandhi accused Modi of siding with the United States and Israel, his words were received with a yawn by Indians who saw it as an almost obligatory jibe by a political opponent.
Given that, we must ask what India would gain by taking sides. Even after its trade deal with the US (that no doubt included provisions about replacing some or all of Russian crude imports with Venezuelan), India still receives about 40 percent of the oil its growing economy needs from Iran and its ally, Russia. On the other hand, the US is by far the biggest destination for Indian exports, more than doubling the second largest, the United Arab Emirates, which also is in the war on the American side. China comes in at Number Four, Russia at 21st; and Iran is number 34, importing about half what Israel does with about a tenth of Iran’s population. India is closely aligned with the United States and Israel as democracies and against China, Russia, and Iran as autocracies. Even throughout the war, India continued buying Iranian crude and selling drones to Israel. So who should India irritate, and what would India gain from doing so?
India also played it smart to let Pakistan try to be the great mediator between the sides, Sure, Pakistan got a lot of international attention for a while, and India could have taken on that role. Anyone with a modicum of insight on the conflict, however, knew that those talks were destined to fail, which they did. The US and Iranian positions were totally antithetical, and the Islamic Republic has never negotiated in good faith. Moreover, Trump is convinced that the US holds all the cards, especially with its blockade of the Straits of Hormuz crippling an already crippled Iranian economy, and he is willing to use that leverage. Iran has not had to deal with that sort of American resolve before, and has not yet figured out how to deal with it. In fact, its one slim hope is that the US opposition will gain enough seats in the November midterm elections that they will undermine that resolve. Even in that case, an actual change in Congressional power would not occur until 2027. When the war ends, however, and someone needs to lead negotiations for a new order in Iran, India will be in a perfect spot. It can say credibly that it has remained neutral and maintained good relations with the peoples of both countries; and it will not have the taint of failure now adhering to Pakistan. Moreover, it is the eleventh largest destination for Iranian exports and the twelfth for US goods, giving it a stake in both countries having (in the case of the US) and rebuilding (in Iran’s case) vibrant economies. The latter will require a heavy lift, and India can be a major player in that rebuild.
As I said in a previous issue, India and Modi are again the adults in the room, favoring real power vs. posturing.