I was one of 20 international geopolitical experts with strong credentials in South Asia, who were interviewed by the FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH CENTRE (FPRC) of New Delhi, India. Its founder and director is Dr. Mahendra Gaur, and I am proud to have been associated with him and the FPRC for many years. We have had many productive sessions both online and in India; and I appreciate FPRC providing a range of perspectives for its various foci.
There were five interview questions, and FPRC did not restrict our answers, whether they agreed or disagreed with any narratives that others bring to the table.
Originally published in The Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal. Citation: Benkin, Richard. “Ukraine Crisis: Indian Perspective.” Interview by the Foreign Policy Research Centre. Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal, July 2022, New Delhi, pp. 34-42.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pXAH4NjTuMunF9QbdyjpWGR7G8LJllud/view
Question #1: “Foreign policy is not about virtue-signaling morality but about acting in the best interests of citizens.” Then why single out India for not condemning Russia for it?
I hate to be so cynical; however, before we get to the question itself, it’s important to recognize that virtue signaling generally happens within a context of “the best interests of citizens,” as understood by their national leaders. They reflect domestic political concerns as well as geopolitical strategy, in addition to any substantive issues. To take an example, in 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor, which was the cornerstone of his effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The United States was surprised by it (largely because the outgoing administration of President Jimmie Carter did not pass on Israeli notification to the incoming administration of President Ronald Reagan); and being pressured by America’s Arab allies, issued a strong condemnation of it. Even so, many in the administration (especially Secretary of State General Alexander Haig) saw the strategic value of it to the United States (US). While public words were strong, action was mild (delaying the delivery of a small consignment of fighter jets and allowing a condemnation resolution to be passed by the Security Council). Ten years later, after the US invaded what would have been a nuclear armed Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney privately thanked the Israelis for that raid. Several US and Israeli officials even at the time of the strike thanked Israel for doing what it did. Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear program was in the best interests of the American people. Condemning it as a violation of principles, as opposed to praising it for its military success, was also in their interests, especially given the Reagan administration’s effort to build alliances with Sunni Arab countries to thwart the new (at the time) Iranian threat. Hence, the seeming contradiction. So we need to parse the public statements and the granular geopolitical interests.[i]
Additionally, East and West (for lack of a better nomenclature) see the war in the Ukraine in very different perspectives. The latter see it as a global conflict; for the former, it is a regional or European conflict, and they have been pulled into European conflicts and spilled a lot of blood far too often in history to blithely join in one again. One cannot deny the global implications, however. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has made no secret of his aim of reconstituting the old Soviet Union to include historical territories like the Ukraine; the war is more significantly, part of an effort by China and Russia to end United States hegemony as the world’s singular superpower with an overwhelming monopoly on the international financial system. It also is a challenge to a rules-based system that favors a liberal democracy or democratic republic over dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. On July 8, 2022, Putin admitted as much while commenting on his war in Ukraine: "The course of history is unstoppable, and attempts by the collective West to enforce its version of the global order are doomed to fail."[ii]
Putin’s blustering aside, the strength of the US economy drives the outcome of both the war in Ukraine and the ultimate struggle for global hegemony. What India does is an important element, and India likely will emerge a stronger player regardless of those outcomes. Hence the measured and relatively mild US comments about India’s stance.
United States officials are well aware of India’s decades-long relationship with Russia and the latter’s involvement in multiple sectors—from oil and food to military sales and training; and more. Moreover, India is dealing with inflation rates similar to America’s, and its bargain purchase of Russian oil since the conflict hopefully will help bring relief to the vast Indian population. So, pay more attention to what comes out of the Biden Administration and from Capitol Hill, than to articles in The Washington Post or other media.
I also disagree with the premise of the question, that the US has singled out India. It also has criticized two close Middle East allies, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, for less than a full throated condemnation of Russia. Like India, both of them have good reasons for their positions, most of it related to the volatility of their Middle Eastern neighborhood; and as with India, the comments have not led to action. Condemning Europe is even trickier. Many European countries are key to the western alliance against Russian aggression, yet continue to be major customers for Russian energy. The latest sanctions passed by the European Union (EU) only embargo Russian crude oil delivered by sea—and not even that until the end of 2022; other petroleum products in 2023. Pipeline deliveries are exempted, and therein lies US
President Joe Biden’s greatest dilemma. One of his early actions after taking office on January 20, 2021, was to drop US sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. If he now condemns Europe’s use of Russian energy, US voters will blame him for his actions and for being unclear in his policies. It would be a political disaster.
Whether justifiably or not, however, India still stands out from other countries not buying into the western narrative about the Ukraine-Russia conflict. If we except those nations irrevocably outside our sphere of influence (Russia and its puppet state Belarus, China, North Korea, and Eritrea), India is the only country to abstain from all three UN resolutions condemning Russia. That, unfortunately, makes it an easy target for words without action.
Question #2: “India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar pushed back against European pressure for India to oppose Russia’s actions in Ukraine by highlighting the fallout of the chaotic withdrawal of Western powers from Afghanistan and their silence on challenges to the rules-based order in Asia for almost a decade. ‘When the rules-based order was under challenge in Asia, the advice we got from Europe is to do more trade. At least we’re not giving you that advice,’ he said. Do you agree?
Minister S. Jaishankar, no less than President Biden or German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz, speaks to his domestic audience whenever he talks. Since the first election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has pushed back against western domination and emphasized India’s place in the international, rules based, world order. Nor is India unique in getting the flawed advice Jaishankar noted. It was, for instance, an essential element in western assumptions about solving the Middle East conflict—that trade and prosperity overcomes other conflicts—which of course has not worked. The same can be said for Jaishankar’s reference to the Afghanistan withdrawal. The way it happened, the people left behind, the options not taken, and more have become something of an embarrassment for many in the West, something that Jaishankar had to know. Meanwhile, India under NDA and UPA governments has developed its own modus vivendi for living with those same challengers to the international rules based order.
Moreover, I think we all recognize that the rules based order is used and discarded as it suits individual actors, which Jaishankar seems to be saying. The number of times so many nations have violated its rules about national sovereignty, and done so with effective impunity from any consequences challenges credulity. Its rules about human rights? Violated every day, with nations large and small, democratic and authoritarian, ignoring them. Israel, and now more frequently India, are judged by different standards and according to inconsistent rules (often fabricated to justify pre-judged narratives) than other countries. We can go on and on. Add to that, the post-World War II rules based order is largely the product of a world dominated by western countries, many of which occupied Asian countries as they touted these rules. So, for instance, what do the rules of sovereignty mean when national borders were drawn by European colonizers in their interests that also ignored the wishes of their many and varied Asian subjects: Pashtun, Baloch, and Sindhi forcibly incorporated into Pakistan, the Durand and Goldschmidt lines; the cobbling together of an Iraq from three separate Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd nations; Chinese troops in Arunachal Pradesh with its huge hydroelectric resources; Tibet; and much more.
Nor is just those “bad” westerners. Asia’s and Africa’s continued passive compliance was possible only because Asian and African elites happily and hungrily grabbed and still grab the substantial material rewards, ignoring the plights of their own people. Today, Asian countries, no less so than western seem to champion situational morality in geopolitical decisions. It’s not all bad. The United Nations can be and often is ridiculous and biased. It also remains the most comprehensive venue for weighing and negotiating that rules based order and reaction to their violation; though it frequently falls short of the mark. With all the above noted violations and cynicism in applying international rules, they are observed more than ignored, just as the worst crime waves obscure the fact that laws are observed far more than broken.
Question #3: “India has several reasons for refusing to condemn Russia for the Ukraine crisis. Everything in the Indian calculus has a “China angle” to it. Do you agree?”
Partly, although India has strategic interests here that exist apart from China. Russia is a declining power and India is an ascending one; and the South Asian giant has to navigate the changing nature of their ties to the former superpower. I do agree that India cannot afford to take its eyes off China regarding any geopolitical venture; and I do not think it does. But China has been somewhat cagey with its positions during the Russia-Ukraine war. At first, it advanced public displays of support for Russia, most notably when the leaders of the two countries stood together at the Beijing Olympics in February 2022 just before Russia invaded Ukraine. Credible reports suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold off the operation until after the Olympics. China’s role in that regard is not unlike Germany’s just before World War I, when it gave tacit approval to the Austro-Hungarian Empire for its attack on Serbia. Of course, the two varied significantly after that when Germany became a combatant. China’s stances are more nuanced than they might appear. Perhaps its most consistent message has been that the West, and particularly the United States, is as much to blame for the conflict as Russia. It often attributes US culpability to its “unfair” treatment of
Russia since the end of the Cold War. But it hardly matters what pretext China uses, since the goal (as I noted in answer to the first question) is to degrade US hegemony. Nevertheless, it distanced itself from Russia and its war atrocities in the Ukraine and in March offered to broker a truce.
We should not let that make us sanguine about it meaning a change in Chinese policy or international morality. The Chinese economy, which still enables Russia to fund its war (now Russia’s top export destination and its only large source of international funds), is dependent on the goodwill of western consumers. If China is seen as a partner in war crimes, it could have a disastrous effect on it, as well as China’s strategic plans via its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), which also depends on trade with the West. (India already has taken a big step in that arena by forcing China to ditch its Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor from BRI.) Given China’s shifting stance and severe economic dependence on western trade, my advice to India would be to keep its gaze fixed on its own geopolitical and economic interests and make sure to assess any moves by China within that context. It makes a lot more sense than trying to parse the motives for China’s frequent changes—let alone anticipate them. That’s also good advice for India to follow in its relationship with the West.
Question #4 “The 2022 Russian-Ukrainian War has put India’s approach to strategic independence under an international spotlight: What New Delhi calls strategic autonomy might just be prettified language for ducking hard choices and in the emerging global order. Is India’s hewing to “strategic autonomy” more trouble than it’s worth?”
What’s wrong with ducking hard choices? Why force yourself to disadvantage your people if you can wait and see if new information makes one choice clearly better than the other? Sometimes not making a choice gives you added leverage for when you do. For example, quite a few Afghans fled to India both before and after the US withdrawal/Taliban takeover. They are people who worked for the US government during its time there and have proven not to be security threats but rather hard working people. Many are stranded there while the bureaucratic machinery of granting them Special Immigration Visas grinds on slowly. Might India offer the US its services to accept them in India, where at least they will be safe, while that process moves ahead? It can be for a temporary stay until the process is complete, or permanent immigration to India, once they prove themselves to be productive citizens.
The specifics can change and be arranged through a process of negotiation; but the idea holds in any of those variations. That would help the US in many ways—from lowering the level of US embarrassment to keeping former US charges safe. What could India demand in exchange for it? Or what if India made certain (significant) emissions commitments. Most Americans understand that while we have to take climate change seriously and do what we have to do in that regard; a real solution to climate change must recognize global, especially Indian and Chinese contributions to greenhouses gases. India, however, cannot shut off its energy flow and thereby retard or even thwart its movement to full development. Another situation in which Indian leverage is high. And how can India help the United States have a strong presence in the area now that they’ve left it. Again, India is the best chance to gain control of rare earth metals and other resources. As with the others, the question is how India can leverage its “strategic autonomy” to be a geopolitical leader. Perhaps India can leverage other countries to recognize and use their leverage take action in defense of persecuted Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
There is a much broader principle at stake in India’s strategic autonomy. In a discussion several years ago in Washington, one powerful US leader asked me what we can do vis-à-vis India. My response was simple: “The first thing we have to do is stop treating India like a pet.” India is one of the most consequential nations on the planet, and its significance only will grow. Certainly, other nations must recognize India as such, however, India itself must act in its foreign policy like a consequential nation. Too often, Indian leaders have not, looking rather for approval from the West, in particular. Strategic autonomy means that era is over, and India never will achieve its rightful place in the panoply of nations until that obsequiousness ends.
This is an historic moment for India to make that jump. It has an assertive Prime Minister and ruling party, and one of the two salient elements of the Modi waves is asserting India’s role in the world. India also has been hewing its own course, based on its interests (such as energy and its historical ties with Russia). Can it be the mediator that helps end this bitter war? In any event, it must signal the rest of the world clearly that it will do what is best for its people, not what any other nation wants it to do, and leverage its importance in exchange for any requested actions. Maximize what it does in, to use the words of an earlier question, the best interests of its people, and get as much as it can for them.
Question #5: At a time when Delhi seemed well inclined toward the West to manage China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis has rattled the strategic frame of reference for the United States and European countries. Does the QUAD Summit (24 May,2022) indicate growing strength?
Undoubtedly. It is difficult to read the statements issued by the QUAD, compare them to bi-lateral communiques Japan and Australia with the United States, and not appreciate India’s importance, especially as they reflect varying positions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• US-Australia: “President Biden reaffirmed his steadfast support for the US-Australia alliance and commitment to strengthening it further. He commended Australia’s strong support for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, and the leaders agreed on the importance of continued solidarity, including to ensure that no such event is ever repeated in the Indo-Pacific.”[iii]
• US-Japan: “As global partners, Japan and the United States affirm that the rules-based international order is indivisible; threats to international law and the free and fair economic order anywhere constitute a challenge to our values and interests everywhere. Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden shared the view that the greatest immediate challenge to this order is Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and unjustified aggression against Ukraine. The two leaders condemned Russia’s actions, and called for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities. They reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of the international community’s unity, and expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people in responding to Russia’s aggression through sanctions, including financial sanctions, export controls, and other steps, taken with like-minded countries to impose long-lasting economic costs on Russia.”[iv]
• US-India: “President Biden met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India today in Tokyo to reaffirm their commitment to work together for a more prosperous, free, connected, and secure world.... President Biden condemned Russia’s unjustifiable war against Ukraine. The leaders’ committed to continue providing humanitarian assistance, and discussed how to cooperate to manage disruptions caused by the war in Ukraine, in particular the rise in energy and food prices, to protect their respective citizens and the world.”[v]
And that was it about Ukraine in the US-India readout. The joint US-India statement reflects the US-India differences in their approaches to the Russia-Ukraine war by statin-g explicitly that “President Biden condemned Russia’s” Ukraine war, not both leaders; which makes it as important for what it did not say as what it did. Specifically, Prime Minister Modi declined to join President Biden’s condemnation. In the published remarks of the two leaders before their bi-lateral meeting, Biden starts by condemning Russia, Modi ignores it, and it is never raised again.[vi] This also tells us that even though the remarks and their joint statement went on and on about the strong US-India relationship, India is strong enough to craft a foreign policy that sometimes varies from that of the US (or any other country). This was not always the case in the past. While not anywhere nearly aggressive as the joint US-Japan statement, even the US-Australian communique connects Russia’s Ukraine war to strategic matters in a not so veiled message to China. That just does not happen in the US-India statement. Rather, it pivots immediately to how committed both nations are to “humanitarian assistance,” which is neutral and needed regardless of what caused the need.
The length of the three communiques is also significant. Australia’s and Japan’s are 135 and 117 words respectively, while India’s is more than four times longer than the larger and almost five times larger than the smaller; unlike the others, replete with bullet points and the announcement of new joint initiatives. These disparities do not occur accidentally or without significance. Not only that, all of the communiques were announced through the White House, further giving observers another indication that the US acknowledges India’s strength and new global profile.
So what does the QUAD statement say about Ukraine. It mentions Ukraine twice, once each in the third and fourth paragraphs.
• “With the COVID-19 pandemic still inflicting human and economic pain around the world, tendencies for unilateral actions among states and a tragic conflict raging in Ukraine, we are steadfast. We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight, all of which are essential to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and to the world. We will continue to act decisively together to advance these principles in the region and beyond. We reaffirm our resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.”[vii]
It merely acknowledges that the “conflict” (i.e. not war or invasion); nor does it include disparaging modifiers such as “unjustified” (Biden) or “brutal” (Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida). It is clear that the Indian Prime Minister would not have concurred with such language, and the other powers demurred in deference to India. It then talks about general principles that readers can connect to the Ukraine conflict or not.
• “We discussed our respective responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing tragic humanitarian crisis, and assessed its implications for the Indo-Pacific. Quad Leaders reiterated our strong resolve to maintain the peace and stability in the region. We underscored unequivocally that the centerpiece of the international order is international law, including the UN Charter, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. We also emphasized that all countries must seek peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.”[viii]
The second and final paragraph that deals with Ukraine also spoke of general principles governing international relations and only implicitly tied them to the conflict. Russia was not even mentioned in the entire communique. That is far more in keeping with India’s statement, in which Russia is mentioned only once and even then disassociated with India. Compare that to the multiple, negative mentions of Russia by Australia and Japan.
The Quad essentially went into hibernation in 2008 at the time of the great economic collapse, and it is no coincidence that it was revived in the final two years of Modi’s first term in office. By then, the world came to recognize India’s new assertiveness and realize its economic and geopolitical importance. What happens next is in India’s hands. There is no doubt of its importance to the United States: as a bulwark against Chinese expansion in Asia; a proxy to maintain joint interests (as well as its own) in the region; and as an economic partner with the United States, as suggested by the initiatives mentioned in the joint statement. India can continue to assert that economic and geopolitical power, even when it means taking an independent course at variance or even in conflict with that of the United States; or it can revert to prior eras, before the current regime and the demands of the Indian people that carried it into power, when its western allies treated India as a pet and India looked to Western Europe for guidance and permission for its direction.
NOTES:
[i] Pulcini, Giordana and Or Rabinowitz. “An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration's Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid.” Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol. 23, No. 2. Spring 2021. https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/23/2/4/101855/An-Ounce-of-Prevention-A-Pound-of-Cure-The-Reagan
Other sources with personal knowledge of events must remain anonymous for security reasons.
[ii] Best, Paul, “Putin claims Russia's war in Ukraine is just beginning,” FoxNews. July 7, 2022.
https://www.foxnews.com/world/putin-claims-russia-war-ukraine-just-beginning
[iii] “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with Prime Minister Albanese of Australia,” May 24, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-prime-minister-albanese-of-australia/
[iv] “Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order,” May 23, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/japan-u-s-jointleaders-statement-strengthening-the-free-and-open-international-order/
[v] “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with Prime Minister Modi of India,” May 24, 2022.
[vi] “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Republic of India Before Bilateral Meeting,” May 24, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/24/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-narendra-modi-of-the-republic-of-india-before-bilateral-meeting/
[vii] “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” May 24, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/
[viii] Ibid.